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he treatment of detainees—interrogation,
detention, and trial—has been among the
most controversial policies in the Bush
administration’s global war on terrorism. Indeed,
many of the questions that have arisen in the
detainee treatment debate are fundamental to
counterterrorism policy, and the next administration will have to provide its own answers as a
basis for whatever approach it adopts. What has
been the import of declaring a “war on terror”?
Is this a wise or sustainable organizing principle
for counterterrorism policy? What are the respective roles of the three co-equal branches of government in establishing and enforcing the rules?
What is the relationship between national security and respect for human rights? Are security and
rights competing interests in a zero-sum game?

T

We believe that there are some general principles
that can be shared across progressive and conservative lines on which national counterterrorism
policy should be grounded. We do not aim to
examine all aspects of counterterrorism policy,
which would require us to address a wide array
of issues of national security, civil liberties, and
human rights—surveillance, seizure of asserted
terrorist assets, use of force short of armed conflict, assassination and targeted kidnapping poli-

cies, and many other matters. We focus instead
on three specific and closely related issues—interrogation, detention, and trials of detainees—as
sources of the principles that should guide counterterrorism policy. We start here because issues
of detainee treatment raise profound questions of
American values.

Should Counterterrorism Policy
Be a “War” on Terror?
Within days—hours, even—of the Al Qaeda
attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration was characterizing it and the US
response as a war. While some argued that the
attacks simply constituted criminality on a mass
scale, bipartisan opinion in the United States
largely coalesced around the view that the United
States was at war, and at war with a transnational, nonstate actor that had declared war upon the
United States. This view gradually was transformed in the rhetoric and policy of the United
States into what the Bush administration dubbed
the “global war on terror.” Although the administration—in an effort to recall the Cold War idea
of a long struggle against a persistent enemy—
recently sought to rename the effort the “Long
War,” the original moniker persists.
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Why does the terminology matter? At one
level, using the war framework helps build
public support for confronting terrorism; the
images, analogies, and metaphors that are
used to justify the national response shape
what kind of action the public supports and its
perception of how long and how deep the
struggle might be. The invocation of war can
justify a great many measures that would not
otherwise be contemplated in a peaceful constitutional democracy—emergency powers,
strictures on civil liberties, the use of force outside of ordinary domestic police powers, a
sense of national unity in a time of crisis that
transcends politics, and a heightened expression of presidential and commander-in-chief
power, potentially at the expense of the other
constitutional branches of government. All of
these measures were evident in the response
following September 11; it would be accurate
to say that despite some misgivings of civil libertarians, in the immediate aftermath of the
attacks, there was broad sentiment across
party lines and across American society that
all of these options for a national emergency
were appropriately on the table and that war
was a good way of summing up the situation.
Six years on, unsurprisingly, this unity has
evaporated. Questioning government and the
policies of the party in power is deeply
ingrained in our political DNA. In the case of
a war that is today more ideological and
metaphorical than “hot”—resembling, in this
regard, the Cold War—fundamental questions
of policy are bound to arise. Thus the very
idea of a “global war on terror” is today seen
as the policy of a particular presidential
The Stanley Foundation’s Bridging the Foreign
Policy Divide project brings together pairs of
foreign policy and national security specialists
from across the political spectrum to find common ground on ten key, controversial areas of
policy. The views expressed in this paper are
not necessarily those of their organizations or
the Stanley Foundation. The series is coedited
by Derek Chollet of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies; Tod Lindberg, editor
of the Hoover Institution's journal Policy
Review; and Stanley Foundation program
officer David Shorr.

administration in a way that it was not immediately following September 11. At this point,
the war on terror no longer serves as simply a
synonym for US counterterrorism policy. The
very question of whether US counterterrorism
policy should be conceived as a war is precisely what is at issue; to refer to it as a war on
terror is to presume the conclusion to a fundamental and contested issue. Hence, in this
paper, when we refer to counterterrorism policy, we mean it in a generic sense of the set of
issues on the table, and when we refer to the
war on terror, we mean the specific and actual, contested and contestable policies of the
Bush administration.
We agree that in the moment of crisis and its
immediate aftermath, the president exercised
extraordinary powers appropriate to the executive role, including the power to use force to
prevent and disrupt further attacks. Moreover,
just as we agree that the moment of crisis occasioned extraordinary executive powers, we also
agree that over time, those powers must diminish in a return to ordinary constitutional order.
As a democracy, we must fashion a response to
the ongoing threat of terror in a constitutionally democratic way. Heightened executive
power eventually must give way to democratic,
majoritarian procedures. The legislature, as a
co-equal branch of government, might understandably be sidelined in the moment of crisis
but, we agree, must reassert itself if it is to
remain a constitutional co-equal. Likewise, the
courts must ensure that individual rights under
the Constitution and obligations under international law are observed. Such rights are a constitutional obligation of the legislative and the
executive branches to protect (although they
may well have their own views as to the content and meaning of such rights), but it is the
province of the courts, finally, to determine and
enforce them.
The characterization of counterterrorism policy as a war on terror affects how domestic
political and constitutional processes come
into play and is, therefore, far more than simply a matter of public motivational rhetoric. It
is language deeply imbued with legal implications. We believe that over time, the character-
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ization of counterterrorism policy as a war
must be limited to its use as a strategic paradigm for dealing with nonstate actors that
have arrayed themselves as enemies of the
United States, but it must be carefully confined
to make clear that this is a strategic, rather than
legal, use of the term. Otherwise, the United
States risks going down the road of authoritarian anti-Communist states in the Cold War—
Chile, for example, or Guatemala—using the
threat of communism as a justification for a
permanent state of emergency and emergency
presidential powers. This is not to say that the
threats posed by terrorism are not real and that
the strategic conception of war was not useful—only that the responses must be crafted
within constitutional democratic processes and
that war, within those processes, has a highly
specific legal meaning that is not applicable to
most matters of counterterrorism policy.

Characterizing counterterrorism efforts as a
war has quite different implications, however,
for actions taken by the United States abroad.1
The Bush administration has wanted quite
inconsistent things from its characterization of
these actions as a global war on terror. There
is, first of all, an inconsistency in strategic
vision in the characterization of war. The
administration has wanted to make clear to
the American people, as well as to the world at
large, that the United States is willing to pursue terrorists wherever they seek to hide—to
deprive them, in the language of the 2006
national counterterrorism strategy, of safe
havens—and to do so using all the tools of
war. Under this view, the entire world is a battlefield. And yet, even as a matter of strategy,
the idea of a global war is more metaphor than
reality; the world in its entirety is not—not
even potentially—a battlefield. The strategic

The heightened executive power
of a crisis eventually must give
way to democratic procedures.
Domestically, the executive branch strengthens
its powers insofar as the immediate crisis is
characterized as a war because the Constitution
gives special powers to the president and commander in chief. More precisely, few question
the enhanced powers of the president in a
moment of crisis such as September 11; when
the crisis is converted into a war, those powers
become the powers of a commander in chief for
as long as the war goes on. It has long been
apparent that the strengthening of those executive powers has been an independent goal of
the Bush administration, apart from the war
on terror itself and sometimes at considerable
cost to it. We disagree about the breadth of the
president’s powers in war, but there is little
doubt that those powers depend on how
broadly war may validly be defined for legal
purposes of the laws and customs of war. But
we are in agreement that as a legal matter, the
administration’s definition of the war is unacceptably broad.

engagement with terrorists is partly in
Afghanistan, but it is also even more so in
Pakistan—and the United States, for political
reasons, at this moment is plainly not willing
to make Pakistan a battlefield. It is also, from
a strategic standpoint, an engagement with
ideologues and radicalized clerics and their
followers in such places as Hamburg,
Birmingham, and Paris—but they obviously
will not be battlefields except in an entirely
metaphorical sense. In our view, insofar as
counterterrorism policy requires all of the
tools of government, most of those tools will
not in fact be the tools of war in the actual
meaning of armed conflict. Instead, they will
involve surveillance, interdiction of terrorist
financing, intelligence gathering, diplomacy,
and other methods. Thus the language of global war is necessarily metaphorical. It should
not diminish the national resolve to defeat the
enemy to acknowledge that actual war is only
one tool in that struggle.

3

4

Thus trying to apply the term war to the entire
effort when it is only intermittently a war
operationally, and therefore legally, in particular times and places creates significant problems. The Cold War was strategically wellconsidered as a war; yet only occasionally and
in certain places around the world did it operationally and legally constitute war. Such is the
case with the war on terror. Calling global
counterterrorism policy a war—not only as a
strategic concept but as a global operational
fact that invokes a specific legal characterization—has profound legal implications and
anomalous legal consequences.

Invoking the Law of War in
Global Counterterrorism
Invoking war as the strategic policy frame has
the virtue of recognizing the way that our enemies see their actions with respect to us.
Likewise, from the viewpoint of the administration, invoking war as the policy frame has
the virtue of rhetorically separating the current
response to terror from policies of the past
that essentially treated terrorism as a matter of
organized crime gone global, appropriate for
law enforcement and the criminal justice system, not the military and war.
But the legal invocation of war against a nonstate, transnational actor or actors creates
many anomalies in the application of the law
of war, an essentially state-centric legal
regime. Counterterrorism is a global struggle
against an enemy which, while obviously real,
cannot be identified by the usual indicia of
victory or defeat—the end of a regime, the
occupation and control of territory, the
destruction of enemy forces. It is therefore
hard to know when, if ever, the war will be
won for legal purposes, a question that is critical for prisoners, who have a legal right to be
released at the end of fighting. One might as
well say spatially that the entire world is a
battlefield, and that temporally, the war will
be won when the threat of terrorist violence is
banished from the world, which will be a long
way off indeed. If correct in any sense, it is
only useful as a strategic metaphor, a way of
saying that our enemies are not limited to any
particular place or people and that they take a

long view of their struggle, as a guide to
strategic analysis and a spur to our own longterm counterterrorism policies.
Other issues arise, however, when our terrorist
adversaries are portrayed as warriors—issues
on which the coauthors are divided. Such a
depiction can have the unintended consequence, Massimino points out, of elevating the
stature of the enemy in the eyes of its own
potential constituency by boosting Al Qaeda’s
mythic appeal as the defender of Islam, its
own preferred image. Anderson, on the other
hand, believes that how our enemies see the
struggle must be integrated into how we see it.
However useful war may be as a strategic
concept, it cannot stand as a legal definition
triggering the rights and duties under the
laws of war, which rightly require a more
tangible and operational foundation. It
would be like saying that the Cold War, at
every moment of its 40-year run, was legally
an armed conflict with the Soviet Union and
the Warsaw Pact. The fact was, instead, that
however much the United States conceived
the Cold War in strategic terms as a war, it
did not treat it as a legal state of war governed by the law of armed conflict. Recourse
to the law of armed conflict was then, as
should be the case now, limited to active hostilities rising to the traditionally accepted definition of an armed conflict. We must not
confuse the important insights of a strategic
view of counterterrorism as metaphorical
war with the legal implications of invoking
the formal laws of armed conflict.
The Bush administration’s invocation of the
laws of war may be strategically useful, but it
is simply at odds with the legal requirement of
an “armed conflict” triggering of the laws of
war. The operational conduct of counterterrorism to date has involved several armed conflicts and might involve more, but the global
war on terror does not meet the legal definition of an armed conflict.
We therefore agree that the Bush administration’s global claim is incorrect as a matter of
law. The administration has dealt with the

lack of fit between the nature of the conflict
and the laws of war in radically inconsistent
ways—but always, it must be said, in ways
that benefit its preexisting desire to strengthen
the hand of the executive branch. We examine
three issues—detention of individuals as
enemy combatants, trials by military commissions of detained enemy combatants, and
interrogations—in which this disconnect has
had the most profound consequences.

Detention
The laws of war permit belligerent powers to
detain captured enemy combatants without
charge or trial for the duration of the conflict
in order to prevent them from rejoining the
fight. The Bush administration embraced the
laws of war and claimed under them the traditional legal right to hold detainees, for example at Guantanamo Bay, until the end of hos-

The inconsistency produced by this decision
was breathtaking. The United States was taking
detainees not only on traditionally defined battlefields such as Afghanistan but also at O’Hare
airport in Chicago and Bradley University in
Peoria. The administration argued first that the
constitutional war powers of the president provided the basis for these detentions; later, it
argued that the detainees were combatants who
could be held for the duration of hostilities.
Invoking constitutional war powers, or alternatively, the laws of war, as a basis for holding
detainees without charge or trial in the domestic legal system, while simultaneously denying
that the laws of war applied to them, created a
legal black hole that threatened to subvert the
laws of war altogether.
Indeed, this critique was shared by most of
the military’s own uniformed law of war legal

The administration has dealt with the lack of fit
between the nature of the conflict and the laws
of war in radically inconsistent ways....
tilities. What is at issue here is not the right of
a belligerent in wartime to hold combatants—
this is undisputed. The dispute is over the very
definition of war in the “global war on terror.” This is a difficulty of legal definition all
on its own on which the coauthors are agreed
that the administration was wrong.
While claiming the rights of a belligerent to
detain captured enemy combatants, however,
the Bush administration at the same time,
through the office of the White House counsel, made one of the most legally and conceptually ill-considered moves in its entire counterterrorism strategy. It concluded that,
although the war on terror was a war, the
Geneva Conventions—the laws of war—did
not apply to those detained in it. Terrorists
are not lawful combatants, it argued, and
hence fall outside the law altogether. They
could thus be dealt with by the commander in
chief at his discretion.

specialists in the military, who have argued
that the Geneva Conventions should apply
only to battlefield detainees, no matter how
one defined the strategic scope of the “war.”
Al Qaeda flunked the tests of Article 4 of the
Third Geneva Convention on POWs, and
hence its members were not entitled to the
privileges of POW status. Prisoners of war are
held to keep from taking up arms again but
are not subject to prosecution or punishment,
provided that they have complied with the
laws of war. For Al Qaeda’s part, though,
while its members were combatants by virtue
of taking an “active part in hostilities,” the
group’s systematic violations of the laws of
war rendered them unprivileged combatants
individually, i.e., unlawful belligerents under
the laws of war. They could be detained under
the law of war and, as unprivileged combatants, charged with crimes arising from their
acts of belligerency, such as murder and
destruction of property. Legal procedures for
trials of unlawful combatants derive from the
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terms of Article 75 of the 1977 Additional
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.2
But this international law of war approach
went unheeded by the administration. Instead,
the administration sought to hedge against legal
challenges to its war-without-law approach by
holding detainees at Guantanamo which, it
hoped, would be beyond the reach of US courts
and habeas corpus. It lost on the substance of
that argument in the Rasul case, having rested
it on a claim of executive power so overreaching that it failed, on the habeas corpus issue, to
gain even Justice Scalia’s vote.
We are in agreement that the scope of the
administration’s global war on terror is legally
too broad. There are two wars in which the
United States is currently involved: Afghanistan
and Iraq. Other armed conflicts may develop,
but the world is not a battlefield in its entirety,
and the United States may not seize and detain
as combatants under the laws of war individuals not directly engaged in these armed conflicts. On this fundamental point we are agreed.
We disagree, however, as to the concept of illegal combatancy. Massimino takes the view that
a person who flunks the tests of legal combatancy in Article 4, Third Geneva Convention,
becomes thereby a civilian protected by the
Fourth Geneva Convention (albeit one who
may be charged with violations of the laws of
war). The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) also takes this view, along with a
significant body of the human rights community. Anderson believes that such an approach
effectively rewards combat that violates the
laws of war and that a person who fails the tests
for legal combatancy is not a civilian, but an
illegal combatant, an unlawful belligerent. The
disagreement is far from merely academic; it
involves fundamental questions of treatment of
civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention
(who nonetheless may be detained as security
risks, but with considerably greater protections
than those afforded unlawful belligerency).
These disagreements between the authors
notwithstanding, both agree that the current
legal situation is an unsatisfying and unwork-

able mish-mash of bits of highly contested
international law combined with Bush administration policy decisions, Supreme Court
opinions that are themselves bits of this and
that, and narrow legislative fixes designed to
satisfy minimum requirements of the case law.
The Supreme Court, in successive cases and
with various hedges, has allowed certain
domestic law remedies at Guantanamo such as
habeas corpus which, while arguably defensible holdings under US domestic law, have no
historical or textual basis in the law of war, at
least regarding foreign combatants. Yet at the
same time that the court has grafted essentially domestic law onto the question of detention, it also has found, in Hamdan, that the
conflict is governed by Common Article Three
of the Geneva Conventions. This legal holding
thus puts a certain practical floor under the
administration’s conduct—prohibiting cruel,
humiliating, or degrading treatment of
detainees and violence to life and person.3
The administration, for its part, has responded to this holding by acknowledging the
application of the Geneva Conventions as a
largely formal matter, asserting that in any
case, the United States is in compliance with
Common Article Three. In the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, the administration
sought and obtained legislation to insulate it
from habeas corpus, claims by detainees
asserting the Geneva Conventions, or other
claims to the contrary.
The most important additional issue with
respect to detention policy is who has the
power to determine that one is a combatant in
the first place and not, say, an innocent shepherd or someone sold into our custody for
bounty by the Northern Alliance. The administration has asserted that this is a matter of
executive branch discretion. Prior to the
Supreme Court’s decisions in the Rasul,
Hamdi, and Hamdan cases, it based this view
on the claim that the Geneva Conventions did
not apply to these detainees, hedging its bets
by keeping them in Guantanamo, which it
hoped would be beyond the reach of the federal courts. After losing, in part, its habeas as
well as other claims defended on executive

power grounds in Rasul and Hamdi, it established limited tribunals for detainees, apparently intended to satisfy the requirements of
the Third Geneva Convention, Article 5,
requiring, in cases of doubt, a tribunal to
determine combatant status.
Those tribunals are of a limited nature—and
judicial review of them is confined to the question of whether the tribunal followed its own
procedures. They have, as a result, been
sharply criticized on due process grounds.
These combatant status tribunals, however,
exist for purposes of establishing the basis for
detention, not for the separate question,
addressed below, of trials for violations of the
laws of war.
Congress has written legislation narrowly
designed to meet the requirements of Hamdan,

would not. But since neither Anderson nor
Massimino regards the executive branch’s designations as actually or potentially infallible,
we agree strongly that this procedure, as
enshrined in the MCA, is unacceptable and
not remediated by the provision of limited
combatant status review hearings.
Congress has so far agreed that federal court
access will not be permitted. Whether the
Supreme Court ultimately will defer to the two
political branches of government on this legislation’s many extraordinary measures is at this
point unknown, but no one doubts that litigation will be both lengthy and momentous.
Changes in party control of one or both houses, or other political factors, or further court
decisions, are highly likely to produce new legislation or significant modifications of existing
legislation—already, the new Democratic

...the United States may not seize and detain
as combatants under the laws of war individuals
not directly engaged in armed conflicts.
and the president has signed it: the Military
Commissions Act (MCA). That legislation is
an admixture of fundamentally domestic
assertions of authority, with one eye defensively fixed upon the requirements of Common
Article Three. Among other things, it purports
to deprive the courts of jurisdiction with
respect to habeas claims by alien unlawful
enemy combatants, and deprives them of the
ability to allege violations of the Geneva
Conventions before any court.4 It makes the
decision to detain someone designated by the
president as an enemy combatant—potentially
even for life—an executive branch determination, and almost entirely unreviewable by the
federal courts.
If one assumes hypothetically that the executive branch is infallible in its judgment as to
who is or is not a terrorist, then one might
accept such an arrangement. In such an “infallible executive” scenario, Anderson would
support such detentions, while Massimino

Congress following the 2006 midterm elections is considering amending the MCA, particularly with respect to habeas corpus.
Yet the pattern of highly reactive legislation is
unfortunately likely to continue. Rather than
pushing for truly systematic reform (as recommended by the authors of this paper further
below), the US legislature seems content to
react either to a specific court decision or to a
particular demand of the executive branch.

Trials of Detainees by Military
Commission and Combatant Status
Review Hearings
Not many months after September 11, the
administration announced that it did not intend
to submit alleged terrorists to regular trial by
the federal courts except in particular circumstances, but would instead submit them to trial
by military commission.5 This procedure is fundamentally different from the combat status
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review hearings described in the preceding section. Those combatant status review hearings
are not a judgment about guilt or innocence;
they are hearings designed to offer a limited
review of whether the person being detained
should be called an “enemy combatant” at all
and whether that person continues to pose a
security risk to the United States.6 The combatant status review hearings are akin to administrative detention hearings, rather than a trial.
By contrast, the military commissions, as originally conceived and in the tradition of US military law stretching back to the Civil War, are
military trials on charges of violations of the
laws and customs of war.
Although possessed of a long history and
indisputably part of military law, such commissions have been hotly disputed in their
specific application in the global war on terror since they were first promulgated in executive orders following September 11, through
to their legislative authorization in the MCA
of 2006. The policy objective of the administration following September 11 was stark—to
make entirely plain that it was breaking with
the criminal law approach to transnational
terrorism pursued by earlier administrations.
The paradigm would be war and, henceforth,
it would operate under the laws of war.
Military commissions were thought to provide a form of justice that is defensible under
US law and military custom as well as international law and custom (once the administration had reversed course on the relevance
of the Geneva Conventions in establishing
unlawful belligerency). The most fundamental objection to military commissions in the
global war on terror—one which we share—
is that whatever the concept of battlefield
detainee arising from either international law
or US military law and custom, the invocation of a global war on terror, with the entire
world a battlefield encompassing Al Qaeda
detainees found in Afghanistan and a US citizen detained in Chicago, is simply too broad
to sustain its legal weight.
The Hamdan court held that the executive
branch exceeded its authority in establishing

military commissions that differed from provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
but the court also emphasized that these issues
could be resolved through legislation. (It also
held, by reason of finding that Common Article
Three applied, that the administration had to
proceed with trials that fell within the meaning
of Common Article Three’s language of “regularly constituted courts.”)7 Accordingly, the
administration sought legislation designed merely to ratify what it already had designed and put
in place. Opposition developed in the Senate,
however, with Republican Senators John
McCain, John Warner, and Lindsay Graham
all insisting on changes to the procedures for
military commissions. After rounds of negotiations on the trial issue, as well as the detention
and interrogation issues, the White House and
the senators reached agreement, and the MCA
was signed by the president in October 2006.
Democrats largely stayed out of the wrangling
between the three Republican senators and
administration, although they fiercely attacked
the bill as it came to a vote and overwhelmingly voted against it. At this writing, the new
Democratic Congress is considering efforts to
amend it.
Although we agree, in principle, that military
commissions can be used to try individuals for
violations of the laws of war, and although we
further agree that the global war on terror is
too broad a definition of war to support the
universal application of military commissions
to all detainees that the administration determines to put on trial, we disagree as to the
proper “fix.” Massimino would require that
all those not captured on a traditionally
defined battlefield be tried, if suspected of
criminal violations, in regular US courts, while
limiting military commissions to those captured on battlefields as traditionally defined in
US military and international law. Anderson
agrees that military commissions should ideally be limited to those captured on traditionally defined battlefields, but does not believe
that those otherwise captured should necessarily be tried in regular US courts. He believes,
as discussed below, that Congress should create a special, civilian counterterrorism court to
try such cases, with limited habeas review by

regular US courts; if such reform is (as is likely)
unreachable, then he prefers the current MCA
approach (modified to include a limited form of
regular court review).
With respect to the initial decision to detain
and its review through the combatant status
review tribunals (CSR tribunals)—as distinguished from any trial that might later follow
for alleged crimes by unlawful belligerents—
we agree that the CSR tribunals are inadequate
as a procedure and put far too much determinative power into executive branch hands—
not just in a moment of uncertain security risk,
but permanently. To the degree that current
legislation gives the executive branch full
power to detain a person as an enemy combatant potentially forever (and we disagree about
whether the MCA in fact grants such power to
the president), it ought to require a far more

Anderson believes, by contrast, that allowing
a backdoor route into the full federal courts
through habeas or other mechanisms is neither required for noncitizens nor acceptable
from the standpoint of national security. He
would prefer the current MCA legislation to
full habeas access to federal court. On the
other hand, agreeing that the current law
lacks sufficient protections, he would prefer
comprehensive counterterrorism reform to
create a special civilian counterterrorism
court with special rules of procedure, evidence, and review that address the special
issues of terrorism. While agreeing that the
United States needs a procedure for administrative detention in terrorism cases using a
special civilian counterterrorism court as its
vehicle, Anderson is skeptical that international human rights law can serve except in a
general and hortatory way as the standard to

...any comprehensive reform
of counterterrorism should take the
military out of the business of detention....
substantive process of review than reflected by
the combatant review status tribunals.
Just as we differed as to the proper fix for the
issue of trial venues and procedures, we likewise differ, however, as to the proper remedy
regarding the decision to detain and to continue to detain. Massimino believes that individuals who cannot be properly considered combatants in an armed conflict, but who nonetheless
are suspected of criminal conduct, should be
tried in the regular federal courts. With respect
to those who cannot be tried but who pose a
serious threat to national security, she believes
that in (the unlikely event of) a full-scale reform
of counterterrorism policy, there might be limited room for legislative enactment of an
administrative detention procedure, outside the
laws of war and outside the military altogether,
provided that it comported with the strict
requirements of international human rights law.

be met. Anderson further believes that a special counterterrorism court should be created
but limited to two functions—to review
administrative security detention decisions by
the executive and to try terrorist criminal
cases for specified terrorist crimes, taking
over from both the regular federal courts and
military commissions.
But there is a significant convergence of
views here on a crucial issue, despite other
disagreements of approach. We think that,
apart from whether these cases should be
heard by the federal courts or, in Anderson’s
view, a special counterterrorism court, any
comprehensive reform of counterterrorism
should take the military out of the business
of detention generally in the war on terror—
including detention and the holding of
detainees, combatant status review hearings,
and military commissions. The “armed conflict” part of the war on terror should be
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confined as a legal matter to armed conflicts
as traditionally defined in the law of war.

irrespective, frankly, of whether and the
extent to which the courts bless it or not.

Yet the legislation passed by Congress to satisfy Hamdan, the MCA, underscores the
increasing distance between the law of war
and the domestic law definitions applicable
to detention and military commissions. The
MCA effectively twists itself into a pretzel
seeking to reconcile a law of war and military
law paradigm with something that, even if it
is not traditional criminal law, does not bear
great resemblance to traditional law of war.
The definition of an unlawful enemy combatant in the MCA, for example, bears very little resemblance to the traditional definition
of a combatant in the laws of war. On the
contrary, the MCA fundamentally reaches to
definitions of persons to be detained that are
appropriate instead to administrative detention procedures, using such standards as
“material support” for terrorism.

Interrogation of Detainees and the
Definition of Torture

That being the case, it is time to call it what it
is (administrative detention), cease applying a
military law rationale to it that does not really work, and make it a civilian rather than
military jurisdiction. The military, we suspect,
would agree. Similarly, on the habeas issue:
While no one seriously wants to extend
habeas protections to ordinary soldiers taken
prisoner on the battlefield, the reason the
issue is now under such bitter debate is
because we also understand that seizing an
American citizen at O’Hare airport is scarcely
the same thing as the capture of German soldiers in Normandy and that it does raise questions about habeas corpus. The pretzel twisting and creation of more and more domestic
law purporting to be military law or international law of war—while having an eversmaller substantive connection with it—risks
both the integrity of our domestic law and the
integrity of our military law and commitment
to the international law of war. While we disagree on exactly how to redress this, we are
firmly in agreement that the limitless legal
extension of the war paradigm exemplified in
the MCA does not work. The current jerryrigged structure makes little sense now and
will not function in future administrations,

Perhaps no issue in the war on terror has
aroused greater passions than the interrogation of detainees. While there is widespread
rejection of torture as un-American, citizens of
this country are profoundly divided as to the
morality of other harsh interrogation techniques, those that constitute cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment short of torture. Many
believe that we should not be parsing a distinction between torture and other cruelty; many
others believe that refusing to use such techniques when they could prevent catastrophic
terrorist attacks is itself a breach of morality.
The United States is not the first country to
grapple with terrorism, and it is not the first to
face the moral and legal dilemmas raised by
these questions.
The administration’s initial approach to
interrogations was to assert executive branch
power and exploit what it saw as ambiguities
in the rules. Where the domestic criminal law
prohibited torture, lawyers at the Justice
Department produced a memo construing the
statute so narrowly that “old-fashioned” torture methods—cigarette burns, breaking fingers—would not qualify as torture, and reassured interrogators that in any event, the
president can authorize violations of the law
in his power as commander in chief. Where
the Geneva Conventions required refraining
from torture, cruel treatment, and outrages
upon personal dignity, administration
lawyers argued that, as unlawful combatants,
detainees in US custody were not entitled to
those protections. Where treaty obligations
required the United States to prevent the use
of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,
the administration reinterpreted a reservation
to the treaty to mean that the United States
was not bound by the prohibition on cruelty
when it acted abroad. When Congress passed
the McCain Amendment and overruled this
interpretation, requiring US personnel everywhere in the world to refrain from cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment of prison-

ers, reports surfaced that administration
lawyers had found a way around that, as
well, by interpreting the prohibition as a flexible standard that would allow cruel treatment in circumstances that did not “shock
the conscience.” When the Supreme Court
ruled in Hamdan that the humane treatment
standards of the Geneva Conventions (found
in Common Article Three) were binding on
the United States in its treatment of all
detainees, the administration sought to
replace that standard with its more flexible
“shocks the conscience” interpretation.
Congress rejected the administration’s proposal to redefine Common Article Three, but
it narrowed the scope of what constitutes a
war crime in ways designed to immunize past
conduct. The president nonetheless concluded
upon signing the bill into law that the CIA
could continue to use a set of “alternative

ever shown that inflicting torture or other such
cruelty yields reliable information or actionable intelligence.8 When the Pentagon released
its new Army field manual on intelligence
interrogations last September, rejecting cruel
and inhumane tactics, Lieutenant General
John Kimmons, deputy chief of staff for Army
Intelligence, explained it bluntly: “No good
intelligence is going to come from abusive
practices. I think history tells us that. I think
the empirical evidence of the last five years,
hard years, tell us that.”9
Moreover, even torture that produces accurate
information may work against US interests.
Longstanding army doctrine cautions that the
use of such techniques, if revealed, could
undermine public support for the war effort
and degrade respect for the standards on
which US troops rely for protection. And cer-

The abuses at Abu Ghraib were effective
only in undermining US moral authority and
providing a boon to jihadist recruitment.
interrogation techniques” beyond those
authorized for use by the military.
In the face of these efforts to circumvent the
rules, the president’s repeated assertions,
however sincere and heartfelt, that “we don’t
torture” ring hollow around the world. And
that is not surprising. We have, in fact, tortured detainees in our custody. According to
the Pentagon’s own figures, at least eight of
these were literally tortured to death—beaten,
suffocated, frozen, hung. How do we account
for this from a country that led the world in
drafting the international convention prohibiting torture?
Torture and other forms of cruelty gain a
seductive appeal during times of insecurity
because of the lure that their use might
“work” to protect innocent civilians from catastrophic harm. But what does it mean to say
that torture “works”? No systematic study has

tainly the abuses at Abu Ghraib were effective
only in undermining US moral authority and
providing a boon to jihadist recruitment.
But despite all this, the lure of torture—or if
not torture, something very close—remains
strong. There persists a communal American
fantasy that if we are ever faced with a ticking time bomb scenario, we can save the day
and avert disaster if only we overcome our
squeamishness and “take off the gloves.”
Indulging in this fantasy has led American
policy far off track and away from the values
of life and human dignity for which it claims
to be fighting this long war. It is time to put
the fantasy aside.10
We share the view that intelligence is one, if
not the most important, tool in combating terrorism today. We also start from the premise
that torture is and should remain illegal. While
there is a range of conduct that the United
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States has agreed to—and should refrain from
(and we may disagree about where that line
should be drawn)—the conduct on that spectrum for which a person can be held criminally liable (war crimes, torture) must be made
crystal clear.
The MCA provides some additional clarity. It
defines what it calls “grave breaches of
Common Article Three,” the violation of
which could subject a person such as a CIA
official to criminal liability. They are: torture,
cruel or inhuman treatment, performing biological experiments, murder, mutilation or
maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily
injury, rape, sexual assault or abuse, and taking hostages. It recognizes that the executive
has the authority to define lesser offenses and
the terms of their criminal liability, as well as
to “interpret” the meaning of the provisions
that do not amount to grave breaches. The act
provides protection from legal action for government officials engaged in interrogations
prior to the act (by making amendments to the
War Crimes Act retroactive to its passage in
1997), and provides that the Geneva
Conventions cannot be invoked as a source of
rights in any court.
Thus, while the law clarifies some matters, it
leaves others open for interpretation. Murder,
for example, mutilation, and rape are clear
enough. But, strikingly, even something as fundamental as torture is not entirely clear under
the new law. During debate about the legislation, Democratic and Republican members of
Congress in both houses gave examples of
conduct that, while not explicitly listed in the
statute, would, in their view, constitute a grave
breach—waterboarding, forced nudity, forcing
a prisoner to perform sexual acts or pose in
sexual positions, beatings, electric shocks,
burns, or other physical pain, the use of dogs
to terrify, induced hypothermia or heat injury,
and mock executions. But none of these techniques, some of which had previously been
authorized by the administration, were explicitly listed in the statute.
This is a mistake. Anderson and Massimino
disagree about many aspects of interrogation

procedures, but we agree that it is the obligation of Congress and the administration to be
transparent and specific with respect to what
constitutes a crime under US law.11
Why is this failure to be specific so problematic? Because the people of the United States
are deeply divided as to the substance of
these issues—torture, not torture, degrading
treatment, not degrading treatment, etc.—
and because such terms as humiliating or
degrading are not plainly objective in the
way that, say, murder is, the only clear democratic means to establish their meaning is
through the process of legislation. But to
meet this need, such legislation must be specific, transparent—and above all avoid
euphemism, generalities, and vagueness.
Granted, no lawmaker willingly votes in a
way to make him or herself any more
accountable than absolutely necessary—but
the importance of these issues is such, and
the divisions among the public is such, that
only public votes on these issues can give the
answers democratic legitimacy. There is, of
course, a further question as to whether the
courts, in their role as protectors of individual rights, would defer to the legislature’s
judgments, and we likely disagree as to the
extent of deference owed. But we do not disagree on the obligation of Congress to legislate plainly on these questions.
We believe this as a fundamental principle of
fairness, not because we think that interrogators should seek to walk right up to that line
of criminal conduct. To the contrary, we
believe that in order to prevent torture, US
policy must build a buffer of additional prohibitions, like a fence around the Torah.12 As former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora
wrote in a memo critical of interrogation policies that permitted the use of cruelty and other
force short of torture: “Once the initial barrier against the use of improper force had been
breached, a phenomenon known as ‘force
drift’ would almost certainly begin to come
into play. This term describes the observed
tendency among interrogators who rely on
force. If some force is good, these people come
to believe, then the application of more force

must be better.” Although agreeing that the
prohibitions against torture require a buffer,
we nonetheless would likely disagree with the
content of what that buffer zone should be.
Many countries that have faced a terrorist
threat have imagined themselves immune from
the force drift phenomenon. In Israel, Turkey,
the UK in Northern Ireland—every democracy
that has tried to walk along the edge of this
cliff, by authorizing abusive treatment only in
emergencies or only with respect to certain
types of suspects, has ended up falling off.
Once physical cruelty and inhumane treatment
is authorized, it is very difficult to contain and
control within preset parameters.
Just as the use of force tends to “drift”
upward, it likewise migrates between agencies.
For this reason, we also agree that both the

Anderson takes the view, for example, that
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights does not, in accordance with
its text and longstanding US views, apply
extraterritorially. Massimino believes that
such treaties bind US actions wherever they
are taken. Our view of how widely human
rights law would serve as a check on US
action thus differs considerably.
Many have argued that while it is fine to have
these standards, we would be wise to keep
them to ourselves. Before the new Army field
manual on intelligence interrogations was
issued, the Pentagon seriously considered
attaching a secret annex in which techniques
permitted for use only on certain detainees
would be listed. The argument for this
approach was that transparency about which
techniques interrogators could use would aid

Once physical cruelty and inhumane
treatment is authorized, it is very difficult to
contain and control within preset parameters.
prohibition against torture, and the “fence”
around that prohibition, should apply equally
to all US personnel. In other words, there
should be a single standard of humane treatment to which all US personnel—military and
civilian—adhere.
This does not mean that all detainees must be
treated alike. We are not arguing here that
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed must be granted
the privileges to which prisoners of war are
entitled. But there should be no daylight
between the baseline humane treatment standards governing military and CIA interrogations.13 In wartime, those standards are found
in Common Article Three of the Geneva
Conventions. Outside of armed conflict, they
are found in international human rights and
domestic law.
The authors disagree, however, as to the
application of international human rights law.

the enemy in resisting. But our biggest problem now is not that the enemy knows what to
expect from us, it is that the rest of the world,
including our allies, does not. So long as they
believe that we are willing to engage in torture
and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment—conduct for which we routinely
condemn others—we will continue to pay for
past mistakes.

Conclusion: The Choice of Paradigms
This paper has focused on the three most
domestically and internationally divisive
issues in the war on terror—detention, trial,
and interrogation. There are many other
issues of grave importance, but these three
capture the fundamental questions of value
that must be answered by national policy in
pursuing counterterrorism. And our answers
on such essential matters—even in the face of
polarizing controversy—will help build a
coherent and sustainable counterterrorism
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policy. Our recommendation is that there be a
return to basics, a return to the question of
fundamental paradigms in US counterterrorism policy.
Counterterrorism has been presented since
September 11 as the choice between a criminal
law model of counterterrorism and a war
model of counterterrorism. That binary seems
to us wrong. What we describe as the war on
terror represents a strategic view of a long
struggle in which strategic war concepts are
appropriate to frame the conflict. They do not
describe, however, the legal requirements for
invoking the law of war in a global war on terror. The contradictions and strains that arise
from trying to fit counterterrorism policy into
the straightjacket of war, while at the same
time seeking to use the law of war as a means
to insulate the executive branch from established checks and balances, are nearing a
breaking point. The MCA is likely to accelerate political crises as much as defuse them
because it is so ill-structured a settlement for
the long term—designed, as it was, to meet the
narrowest requirements of a Supreme Court
decision and make up for mistakes made early
in the interrogation and detention process.
The counterterrorism policies of any new
administration or new Congress, of whatever
party, Republican or Democratic, must start
from a view that counterterrorism operates
across a wide range of activities. At one end is
law enforcement, particularly domestic law
enforcement (the kind that breaks up domestic
terrorist plots). At the other end is war—actual war, armed conflict involving armies and
troops and the weapons of war. War, we can
now begin to see, is more often aimed at government backers of terrorists rather than the
terrorists themselves. The real action against
terrorists themselves takes place in a zone
between those two extremes. The tools in this
zone include surveillance, tracking and seizure
of terrorist assets, cooperation with foreign
intelligence and police services, domestic security measures for key infrastructure, protection
of air travel, and so on. It also includes detention, interrogation, and the use of force short
of war, such as attacks on terrorist training

camps, targeted assassinations of terrorists,
and other uses of violence that do not always
rise to the legal level of “armed conflict.”
It is this ground between the extremes that
inevitably will be the focus of most of our
counterterrorism efforts in the future, and we
badly need legal rules to define that zone of
action and its limits. The coauthors may disagree over precisely how those rules should be
shaped and, perhaps most deeply, over the role
of the courts in monitoring and policing the
activities of this category of activity. But we
are agreed that developing this center category
of activities, which are neither pure criminal
justice nor war, will be the key to a counterterrorism policy that moves beyond policy
binaries that ill-serve the United States, operationally and legally. Comprehensive counterterrorism policy for a new administration and a
new Congress will necessarily look beyond the
simple alternatives of law enforcement or war.

End Notes
1

Or against non-US citizens. The Military Commissions
Act of 2006, for example, distinguishes flatly between
citizens and noncitizens. We disagree as to whether this
distinction of nationality is appropriate or consistent
with domestic or international human rights law.
2

Although the United States has not ratified Protocol I, it
has accepted that Article 75 reflects customary law binding on the United States.
3

Yet the court seems not to have considered the possibility that by finding that the conflict with Al Qaeda is a
conflict “not of an international character” so as to
invoke Common Article Three, it arguably cut out application of nearly all of the rest of the Geneva
Conventions, including the grave breaches provisions,
for example, and the Article 5 tribunal mechanism for
determining combatant status, all of which arguably
require that the conflict be an Article 2 international
armed conflict precluded by application of Common
Article Three. We ourselves disagree (as do military law
experts) as to the legal consequences of the court’s rather
sparsely reasoned holding on this vital question.
4

The MCA purports to do more than deprive detainees
of a private action under the GCs. It says that no person
can invoke the GCs as a source of rights, even in a
habeas or other action.
5

We use military commission and military tribunal
here interchangeably; we reserve the term court martial for regular proceedings under the full mechanisms
available to US soldiers under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.
6

The issue of habeas corpus is most relevant to the detention question, rather than trials under the military commissions, since habeas pertains in the first place to the
legal grounds for holding the detainee.
7

What constitutes a “regularly constituted court” for
purposes of Common Article Three promises to be a
hotly contested issue, which Hamdan failed to quiet, and
it is an issue on which we likely disagree but will not pursue here.
8

This is not the same as saying that nothing revealed
under torture is ever true. But intelligence must be more
than simply true in order to be useful. When US personnel beat an Iraqi Army general, bound him, and stuffed
him head first into a sleeping bag, the only information
he revealed before he died was information already
known to his interrogators.
9

Anderson is frankly skeptical of the assertion that torture does not produce useful information, or at least does
not produce useful information distinguishable from
intelligence “noise.” However, he does not argue for
making torture legal under any circumstances. The fundamental issue, for Anderson, is not the illegality of torture, but how it and other terms such as inhumane treatment or cruelty are to be concretely defined so as to
make transparently clear what is legal and illegal.

10

Anderson notes that even if, as he acknowledges, the
“ticking time bomb” scenario is largely, though not entirely, a chimera that is tangential to the daily toil of thwarting terrorist plots, it enjoys political support that cannot
be dismissed out of hand. A significant range of political
figures—including Hillary Clinton, Chuck Schumer, and
John McCain—have said they might resort to torture if
necessary in such a scenario. It cannot, therefore, be
viewed purely as a fixation of the Bush administration.
11

A further issue that deserves a clear policy is whether
certain techniques are permissible in certain situations.
Can more aggressive interrogation be used on a known
terrorist mastermind such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
as opposed to a person who may still turn out to be the
innocent shepherd? We differ as to this general principle—Anderson in favor, Massmino against—but we
agree the matter must be clarified in legislation.
12

According to Jewish law, the precepts of the Torah were
to be “fenced around” with additional restrictions in
order to prevent violation of the core precepts themselves.
13

Anderson believes that while a comprehensive reform
of the existing system should establish a single standard
across the US government, there are practical difficulties.
He believes that the existing US military manual is too
restrictive, for instance, in a case like Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed. Since revision of the military manual is in
Anderson's view not likely, and probably not wise, he
would accept two standards today: one applicable to the
military, and one applicable to all civilian agencies.
Massimino would hold the civilian agencies to the military standard.
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